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Why Truthlikeness?
1 According to the realist view, inquiry begins with a cognitive problem that has the form of
a question. An answer expresses a proposition about the world or a part of it, whether
present,  past or future,  and is  the overall  goal  of inquiry.  Answers can be partial  or
complete (Niiniluoto 1987: 203, 129-30). A complete answer to a cognitive problem is the
whole truth. Thus, we might say that the (or a) goal of inquiry is the truth. Call this the 
truth doctrine. Optimism suggests that the history of science is a progress toward this aim
by way of increasingly accurate theories – call this the progress doctrine (Oddie 1986: 1). But
fallibilism holds that our theories are generally false or likely to be false, and are, after
falsification, replaced with other theories that are also likely to be false.1 One motivation
for the notion of truthlikeness in science is the desire to be an optimistic fallible realist
about inquiry (Niiniluoto 1987: 156; Oddie 2014).
2 Another motivation is to account for our seeming ability to grade various propositions in
different  situations according to their  closeness  to the truth within those situations.
Compare:
1) The number of planets in our solar system is 9.
2) The number planets in our solar system is 900.
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3 Intuitively, (1) is closer to the truth than (2), implying that one falsehood can be closer to
the truth than another. Consider another pair:
3) The number of planets is between 7 and 9.
4) The number of planets is greater than 0.
4 (3) seems closer to the truth than (4), implying that some truths are closer to the whole
truth  than  others  (cf.  Oddie  2014).  Similar  comparisons  are  possible  for  qualitative
propositions.
5 Finally, it seems that sometimes a false theory can achieve the aims of inquiry better than
a true one that is more limited in scope. 
There may be topics where the best we can do is not to arrive at propositions that
are true but to arrive at propositions that are as little false as possible. […] Some
false propositions may be far more worth asserting, may be of far more importance
for developing a less incorrect view of reality or parts of reality than hosts of true
propositions of less range and significance. (Ewing 1934: 226-7)  
6 A notion of truthlikeness should be able to show how this is possible.
7 Discussions of truthlikeness have largely been limited to natural science. One reason for
extending the concept to historiography is  that  this would allow us to be optimistic
fallible realists about historiography.
 
Realism, Skepticism, and the Fundamental Ontological
Tradeoff
8 In  the  face  of  disagreements  over  notions  like  evidence,  we  might  define  historical
knowledge as the analysis of extant evidence with the aim of drawing inferences about
history, that is, past events (Tamm 2014: 285-6; Tucker 2006: 1). Historiography consists of
representations  of  past  events,  since  historians  cannot  observe  them.  Hence
historiography is not the study of past events, but the study of traces of the past; it is the
art of reasoning from traces to facts (Tucker 2006: 1, 93).
9 There  are  two  positions about  the  relationship  between  historiography  and  history:
realism and constructionism. The latter can support some version of anti-realism, but
does not necessarily entail it, since something can be constructed in the present and be a
true account of the past. Let’s say that general realism about some subject matter or field
of inquiry is the following thesis:
(GR) General Realism: Given a, b, c, … as the distinctive objects of a subject-
matter, and F, G, H, … as distinctive properties of these objects, then it is the
case that
(EC) The existence claim: a, b, c, … exist and have properties such as F, G, H, …;
and
(IC) The independence claim: the existence of a, b, c, …, and their having the
properties F, G, H, … is independent of anyone’s beliefs, linguistic practices,
conceptual schemes, and so on.
10 In short, realism ascribes objective, mind-independent existence to various objects and
properties, such as the external world, mathematical objects, or the past. The world is as
it is, independently of what anyone else thinks about it (Miller 2014). 
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11 Although realism can be accepted or rejected across the board, it is more common to be
selectively realist or non-realist about various topics. For example, one can be a realist
about  everyday  macroscopic  objects  but  an  anti-realist  about  abstract  objects  like
numbers. 
12 In turn, anti-realism in the broad sense could be defined as the following thesis:
(GAR)  General  Anti-Realism:  Given a,  b,  c,  … as  the  distinctive  objects  of  a
subject-matter, and F, G, H, … as the distinctive properties of these objects,
then it is the case that either
(NEC) The negative existence claim: a, b, c, … do not exist and/or do (not) have
properties F, G, H, … ; or2
(DC) The dependence claim:  the existence of a,  b,  c,  …, and their having the
properties F,  G,  H,  … is  dependent on people’s  beliefs,  linguistic practices,
conceptual schemes, and so on.
13 Anti-realism denies the objective, mind-independent existence of objects and properties
affirmed by realism in a particular domain or with respect to some subject matter.
14 Semantic  realism retains EC from GR but  reformulates  IT in terms of  the principle  of
bivalence: every meaningful sentence about a, b, c, …, having or not having F, G, H, …, is
either true or false independently of whether we are or will ever be able to ascertain this.
Anti-realists  deny  bivalence  (see  Dummett  1959,  1978,  1983,  1991).  Note  that  this
characterization of realism is controversial. Realism requires the objective independent
existence of those entities that make statements about them true. Semantic realism says
nothing about the nature of the reality that makes such statements true or false (Devitt
1983: 77). Thus, semantic realism is not equivalent to realism, since realism “says nothing
semantic at all beyond […] making the negative point that our semantic capacities do not
constitute the world” (Devitt 1991: 39).
15 Realism about historiography claims that historiography is a representation of history, that
historiography is a true account of past events.  Historiography interprets or explains
historical  evidence to infer  from present  traces  to past  events  (Murphey 1973,  1994;
Tucker 2006:  255).  Constructionism claims that  historiography is  a  construction in the
present,  not  a  representation  of  the  past.  Historiography  does  not  refer  to  history
because sentences about the past are neither true nor false; they have no truth value
because they have no clear truth conditions. Since the past is inaccessible, all we have are
historians’  present  constructions.  Any  further  metaphysical  assumptions  about  the
reality of  the past  are unwarranted (Tucker 2006:  255-6).  The most  extreme form of
constructionism is skeptical constructionism or historiographic skepticism which claims that
there  is  no  knowledge  of  history  because  historiography  is  ontologically  and
epistemically indistinguishable from literary fiction (ibid.:  256). This view rests on the
postmodern  challenge (so-called  because  its  most  prominent  supporters,  like  Roland
Barthes  and Hayden White,  either  were  or  drew heavily  from post-structuralist  and
postmodernist  thinkers).3 The  epistemic  side  of  the  challenge  asks  how  textual  and
archaeological evidence warrants truth apt assertions about the past. The semantic side
concerns whether signs in general,  and textual evidence in particular,  can refer to a
language-independent past. There seems to be a connection between semantic realism
and realism about historiography since our access to the past is  largely mediated by
(written)  evidence,  and  if  such  evidence  cannot  be  true  or  false,  then  we  cannot
justifiably make inferences about the past on the basis of present evidence.
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16 Realism and constructionism are competing ontologies of historiography, and hence face
the fundamental ontological tradeoff, a tension between explanatory power and epistemic
risk:  a  rich  ontology  has  greater  explanatory  power  but  a  modest  ontology  is
epistemically safer. The more ontological machinery we postulate, the more we might be
able to explain, but the harder it is to believe in the existence of all the postulated entities
and  relations  (Swoyer  &  Orilia  2011).  The  strengths  of  anti-realism  in  general,  and
constructionism in particular, are simplicity and epistemic safety, since they make fewer
assumptions  than  historiographical  realism.  The  strength  of  realism  is  explanatory
power, because it is a better explanation of consensus about historical facts, theories, and
methods among a large, uncoerced, and heterogeneous group of historians (Tucker 2006:
257). 
17 The debate between realism and constructionism touches on a number of interrelated
issues. The first of these is realism and anti-realism about meaning in historiography.
Historiographical texts employ proper names (Julius Caesar), names of institutions (the
Roman senate), and abstract concepts (revolution). Do such expressions refer to entities
that actually existed in the past? It is conceivable that they existed independently of
historians’ representations (EC) but that the past is nonetheless constructed from their
representations  (DC).  Secondly,  there  is  the  issue  of  the  epistemic  status  of
historiographical  explanation.  The  aforementioned  concepts  are  based  on  present
evidence of  the past.  Such evidence can be missing,  erroneous or sometimes require
distance to be properly understood. This casts doubt on the notion that the concepts
found in historiographical texts refer to past existents. Third, there is the ontology of
history. The different kinds of expressions and concepts employed in historiographical
texts suggest different kinds of ontologies: proper names seem to require the existence of
past individuals, institutional names the existence of institutions, and abstract terms the
existence of kinds.4 All of these issues cannot be dealt with in this paper since each would
require further investigation. What I have to say will touch mainly on realism and anti-
realism  about  meaning,  but  not  on  the  epistemology  and  specific  ontology  of
historiography.  I  will  draw on Charles S. Peirce’s  semeiotics,  logic,  and philosophy of
science  to  provide  a  metaphysically  modest  ground  upon  which  a  concept  of
truthlikeness in historiography can be established. This would open the way to optimistic
fallibilist realism about historiography.
 
Desiderata for a Concept of Truthlikeness in
Historiography
18 Before a measure of truthlikeness can be defined, we need to know the requirements that
such a measure should fulfill.  There is  no prima facie good reason to suppose that  a
measure  suitable  for  theories  in  the  natural  sciences  can  be  expanded  without
modification to the human sciences. Hence we should examine the characteristic features
of historical knowledge and its acquisition in order to see which modifications, if any, are
in order.
19 Realism seems to be connected with the correspondence theory of truth, since it requires
an objective relation of reference between expressions and the world (see Putnam 1978:
18). The correspondence theory claims that a proposition is true if it corresponds to the
way  things  actually  are,  that  is,  to  the  facts.  The  correspondence  theory  has  been
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criticized on numerous grounds over the years. Instead of reviewing the objections I will
simply remark that, prima facie, the correspondence theory faces additional difficulties
when  extended  to  historical  knowledge.  Such  knowledge  is  neither  based  on  nor
corroborated  by  observations  of  historical  events.  Historical  facts  are  not  given.
Historiography presents descriptions of such events on the basis of evidence.  It  “is a
science whose business is to study events not accessible to our observation, and to study
these events inferentially, arguing to them from something else which is accessible to our
observation,  and  which  the  historian  calls  ‘evidence’  for  the  events  in  which  he  is
interested” (Collingwood 1956: 251-2).
20 Historical events transfer information through evidence because each event generates
numerous informational signals, most of which are gradually lost or corrupted over time.
Historians attempt to extract information about historical events from the evidence by
separating later  additions  and distortions  from the original  signal  (Kosso 1992:  32-3;
Tucker 2006: 18). The relationship between historiography and evidence is similar to the
relationship between theory and evidence in other sciences:  descriptions of historical
events in historiography are akin to descriptions of unobservable entities, like electrons,
in physics, since both are grounded in inferences based on publicly observable evidence -
the former on written documents, the latter on instrumental measurements (Kosso 1992;
Murphey 1973: 16).
21 Methods for producing historical knowledge are communal in the sense that there is a
large, uncoerced, heterogeneous community of historians who agree on acceptable means
of  obtaining evidence,  strategies  for  using said evidence,  conventions for  conducting
disagreements, and shared assumptions about the division of labor in inquiry (Tucker
2006: 6, 20ff). Historians construct explanatory hypotheses to explain the evidence, and
use  evidence  to  confirm  hypotheses  (Goldstein  1996:  9-10).  The  evidence  must  be
interpreted before it can support explanatory hypotheses. Interpretative judgments serve
partly as organizing principles for describing past events, and criteria of relevance for the
selection of additional evidence in support of explanatory hypotheses (cf. Stalnaker 1967:
176).  Since explanations of  historical  evidence can be wrong,  historical  knowledge is
fallible (Tucker 2006: 257).
22 Thus,  a  realist  account  of  historical  knowledge  that  would  support  a  notion  of
truthlikeness in historiography must be fallibilist, closely related to inquiry, include the
communal aspect of inquiry, account for the interpretative practices involved in inquiry,
and allow for some kind of causal informational link (e.g. by way of reference) between
past events and their present traces.  Thus,  to establish a concept of  truthlikeness in
historiography, we need at least three things: 
1)  a  referential  theory of  meaning,  because this  supports  realism by explaining how
statements about the past can be true or false due to being about actual past event; 
2) a fallibilist account of inquiry; 
3) an account of truth that leaves room for progress toward the truth, and accounts for
the role of consensus in the whole process. 
23 The underlying realism should be modest in order to successfully compete with anti-
realist alternatives while retaining its explanatory advantage. I will argue that Peirce’s
semeiotics  and  pragmatist  theory  of  truth,  when  interpreted  dialogically,  provide  a
modestly  realist  basis  from  which  to  develop  an  account  of  truthlikeness  in
historiography that satisfies the three desiderata outlined here.
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24 However, before laying the groundwork for such an account, I  must first address the
postmodern  challenge  because  if  it  stands,  then  realism  about  historiography  is
untenable. I will focus on its semantic aspect, mentioning the epistemic aspect only in
passing because it has already elicited a number of novel replies. The semantic aspect
rests on a conflict between competing theories of meaning: realists insist that sentences
receive their meaning from their relations with the world; skeptics subscribe to the view
that sentences receive their meaning from their relations with other sentences (Tucker
2006: 7-8).  I  will  defend realism by challenging the arguments of Roland Barthes and
Hayden White, the two main proponents of the postmodern challenge.
 
The Postmodern Challenge
25 Modern historiography rests on two methodological presuppositions:
– The ontological presupposition: the past is real, what happened did formerly exist, and the
nonpresence  of  the  past  (and  of  the  future)  cannot  be  identified  with  its  unreality
(Françoise Châtelet, quoted in Le Goff 1992: 10).
–  The  epistemological  presupposition:  every  discourse  about  the  past  must  be  able  to
rigorously show, on the basis of evidence, why it proposes a particular sequence of events
rather than another (ibid.: 11).
26 The historian’s knowledge of the past is indirect. Texts and archaeological sources only
give answers to the questions we pose to them. The historian’s work begins by posing a
question which expresses his or her cognitive problem (cf. Bloch 1953: 48-50, 53-4, 64-6).
27 The postmodern challenge is  a challenge to the scientific status of  historiography.  It
replaces the question “How is history like science?” with the question “How is history like
and unlike fiction?” as one of the main issues in the philosophy of history. It rests on two
theses:
– Anti-representationalism:  the past cannot be the referent of historical statements and
representations (Zagorin 1999: 13).
–  Narrativism:  the fictional  stories  invented by writers  and the narrations crafted by
historians do not differ in any essential respect (ibid.: 14).
28 Anti-representationalism does  not  entail  that  constructivists  are  all  anti-realists  who
deny the existence of reality. They claim that the reality referred to by signs is ultimately
inaccessible to us due to innumerable mediations between us and the sign’s referent
(Jenkins 2000: 187). The postmodern challenge undermines the apparent obviousness of
modern  historiography’s  two  methodological  presuppositions  whereas  realism would
uphold them. 
 
Barthes’ Argument for Anti-Representationalism
29 In his 1967 essay, “Le discours de l’historie,” Roland Barthes gave an influential argument
for anti-representationalism, which can be summarized as follows:
1) Language is incapable of referring to anything outside itself, such as the world, reality,
or the past.
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2)  Both  historiography  and  narrative  fiction  employ  the  reality  effect,  creating  a
referential illusion of apparently being about reality, while actually replacing the text’s
referent with narrative. 
3) History appropriates narrative structures from fiction, where these were originally
developed.
4)  Therefore,  narrative history is  indistinguishable from narrative fiction (cf.  Doležel
2010: 16-9).
30 The first premise rests on structuralist literary theory and poststructuralist philosophy of
language (Doležel 2010: 16). Both draw on Ferdinand de Saussure’s semiology which rests
on a dyadic sign model according to which a sign is a composite entity made up of two




31 For  Saussure  (1959:  66-7),  the  signifier was  a  sound-image.  Subsequent  semioticians
treated it as a material sign-vehicle, e.g. a sound, a printed letter, a gesture, and so on.
The signified is the conceptual part of the sign – a mental entity, image or concept (Sebeok
2001: 5-6). A sign’s meaning is constituted by its language-internal relations of opposition
with other signs in the language (Saussure 1959: 88).  There are two kinds of internal
relations: syntagmatic relations between signs that can be conjoined in well-formed strings
called syntagms (e.g. the relation between “the king” and “approves” since they can be
conjoined into “the king approves”),  and paradigmatic relations between a sign and its
possible alternatives in well-formed syntagms (e.g. the relation between “approves” and
“disproves” because the latter can replace the former) (Devitt & Sterelny 1999: 262). This
leads to a holistic view of language. The meaning of a sign is defined by its relations to all
other  signs,  by  its  place  in  the  entire  structure  (Saussure  1959:  22).  Language  is an
autonomous system that is to be explained on its own terms, without any reference to
anything outside its structure (Hawkes 1977: 16-7). Reference is a relation between a sign
and the object it represents, the referent. As a concept, the signified is determined entirely
by language-internal syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations without any reference to
language-external entities (Saussure 1959: 111-2; cf. Jameson 1972: 105-6; Hawkes 1977:
17). Post-structuralists, many of whom were not linguists, have interpreted Saussure’s
holistic view in an anti-referentialist  way.  There seem to be at least two reasons for
rejecting reference in  the post-structuralist  literature.  First,  signification is  arbitrary
because it rests on a convention maintained by the linguistic community (Saussure 1959:
67).  There  is  no  natural  connection  between signifier  and  signified  (ibid.:  68-9).  The
assumption  seems  to  be  that  arbitrariness  undermines  reference,  and  hence  that  a
relational analysis is the only viable alternative (Devitt & Sterelny 1999: 267). Secondly,
there is the argument from color terms: the signified of a color term, such as “brown,”
does not include reference because color terms cannot be taught by the presentation of,
say, brown objects.
It is only when he [the pupil] has grasped the relation between brown and other
colors that he will begin to understand what brown is. […] the signifieds of color
terms are nothing but the product or result of a system of distinctions. (Culler 1976:
25) 
32 Thus, the referential dimension of language is denied. Some authors have gone so far as
to  talk  of  a  “referential  fallacy”  that  results  from  substituting  reality  for  its
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representation.5 Barthes draws on semiology when he claims in his first premise that
language cannot refer to anything outside itself.
33 The second premise claims that historiography and narrative fiction are similar in that
both employ the reality effect  and create the illusion of  reference to extra-linguistic
reality.  The reality effect is a complex operation that involves two phases.  In the first
phase, “the referent is detached from the discourse, it becomes exterior to it, grounds it,
is supposed to govern it: this is the phase of res gestae, and the discourse simply claims to
be  historia  rerum gestarum”  (Barthes  1967:  138).  In  the  second phase,  the  signifier  is
replaced with the referent. In this, historiography resembles the historical novel where
concrete details, such as descriptions of the setting or costumes, are also constituted by
the “direct collusion of a referent and a signifier” (Barthes 1968: 147-8). As a result “this
same ‘reality’ becomes the essential reference in historical narrative, which is supposed
to report ‘what really happened’” (ibid.:  146).  The reality effect  consists  in “the very
absence of the signified, to the advantage of the referent alone, [which] becomes the very
signifier of realism” (ibid.: 148). From the perspective of narrative structure, such details
are superfluous, but they serve to create the referential illusion of an objective discourse
where history narrates itself (Barthes 1967: 131-2). Historical facts have only linguistic
existence,  but  because  of  the  referential  illusion,  such  facts  seem to  be  anterior  to
historiography (ibid.: 138). Hence historiography and narrative fiction are similar in that
both rely on the reality effect  to create the referential  illusion that the discourse in
question refers to reality.
34 The third premise of Barthes’ argument is that history appropriates narrative structures
from fiction, where they were originally developed: “narrative structure, elaborated in
the crucible of fictions (through myths and early epics), becomes both sign and proof of
reality” (Barthes 1967: 140). His conclusion is that narrative history and narrative fiction
are indistinguishable. Historical discourse is “essentially an ideological elaboration or, to
be more specific, an imaginary elaboration” (ibid.: 138).
35 Barthes’ views fail to satisfy the three desiderata for the notion of truthlikeness set out
above:  his  theory  of  meaning  rejects  reference,  equating  historiography with  fiction
leaves no room for truth, and this leads to skepticism, not fallibilism about historical
knowledge. Barthes’ conclusion must be challenged in order to make way for a concept of
trutlikeness in historiography.
36 Barthes’ argument has numerous weaknesses that the realist could exploit in mounting a
counterattack.  First,  one  could  challenge  the  first  premise.  The  arbitrariness  of
signification is not a sufficient reason for rejecting reference. The structuralists seem to
presuppose that the only possible theory of reference is a naïve picture theory according
to which signs are “pictures” of things: if signs are “pictures,” then their relation to their
referents is not arbitrary – they would be constrained by their likeness to their referents;
if  signification  is  arbitrary,  then  signs  cannot  be  “pictures”  of  their  referents;
signification is arbitrary; thus, signs are not pictures and cannot refer (Devitt & Sterelny
1999: 267). Evidence for this presupposition can be found in structuralist writings:
There  exists  no  necessary  “fitness”  in  the  link  between  the  sound-image,  or
signifier ‘tree,’ the concept, or signified that it involves, and the actual physical tree
growing  the  earth.  The  word  ‘tree,’  in  short,  has  no  “natural”  or  “tree-like”
qualities […]. (Hawkes 1977: 25)
37 But arbitrariness and reference can be compatible. Reference does not involve picturing;
it could instead be understood along causal lines (Devitt & Sterelny 1999: 267).
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38 The argument from color  terms is  implausible.  First,  it  is  unlikely  that  an organism
incapable of discriminating between brown and other colors would be able to acquire the
concept of brown. But even if learning color terms involves nothing above and beyond
learning their language-internal differences from other color terms, it does not follow
that color terms do not refer or that their reference depends on other color terms in the
language. What is required for learning reference is one thing; what reference consists in,
is  another  (Devitt  &  Sterelny  1999:  268).  Second,  cross-linguistic  surveys  of  color
terminology have shown that while languages do differ in the number and extensional
range of their color categories, the amount of cross-linguistic diversity is notably reduced
when speakers of different languages are asked to identify “good examples” of their color
words, such as a “good red.” Speakers then tend to select colors from a very limited area
of the color spectrum. This suggests that there is a universal set of focal colors, from
which different languages make their selection. Furthermore, the lexicalization of color
terminology in different languages shows notable uniformities: black, white, and red are
generally lexicalized first, while pink, purple, and grey appear last (Berlin & Kay 1969).
The existence of a small number of relatively universal focal colors is also supported by
evidence from cognitive psychology (see Heider 1971, 1972).
39 The  rejection  of  reference  encourages  anti-realism,  because  access  to  a  language-
independent  reality  by  way  of  signs  becomes  problematic  if  the  referential  relation
between  sign  and  world  does  not  have  any  bearing  on  the  sign’s  meaning.  While
semiology does retain some notion of reality, since the signified as a concept is a concept
of something (Jameson 1972: 106), this something is a reality created by language itself
(cf. Hawkes 1977: 26, 149). While the poetic, world-making powers of language cannot be
denied (cf. Goodman 1978), overemphasizing them leads to the view that (human) reality
is language-dependent (cf. Hawkes 1977: 28), that the language-independent world is a
mysterious and inaccessible “formless chaos of which one cannot even speak in the first
place,” (Jameson 1972: 33) and to relativism which claims that different autonomous sign
systems create different, independent and incompatible realities (Hawkes 1977: 56). The
corollaries  of  this  view  of  language  are  the  inaccessibility  of  the  past,  and  an
understanding of historical discourse as analogous to fiction-making in that it creates the
past it surreptitiously purports to be about.
 
White’s Argument for Narrativism
40 Hayden White has given a prominent argument for the narrativist thesis. His research
into how elements of narrative discourse function in historiography was influenced by
Barthes. In fact, White’s approach draws explicitly from poststructuralist philosophy of
language, and embraces its constructivist implications:
Historical accounts purport to be verbal models, or icons, of specific segments of
the historical process. But such models are needed because the documentary record
does not figure forth an unambiguous image of the structure of events attested in
them. In order to figure “what really happened” in the past, therefore, the historian
must  first  prefigure  as  a  possible  object  of  knowledge  the  whole  set  of  events
reported  in  the  documents.  This  prefigurative  act  is  poetic  inasmuch  as  it  is
precognitive and precritical in the economy of the historian’s own consciousness. It
is also poetic insofar as it is constitutive of the structure that will subsequently be
imaged  in  the  verbal  model  offered  by  the  historian  as a  representation  and
explanation of “what really happened” in the past. But it is constitutive not only of a
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domain which the historian can treat as a possible object of (mental) perception. It
is also constitutive of the concepts he will use to identify the objects that inhabit
the domain and to characterize the kinds of relationships they can sustain with one
another.  In  the  poetic  act  which  precedes  the  formal  analysis  of  the  field,  the
historian both creates his object of analysis and predetermines the modality of the
conceptual strategies he will use to explain it. (White 1973: 30-1)
41 White argues that historiography is equivalent to fiction-making, because emplotment is
a literary operation employed by both historiography and literature, and literature is
fiction. His argument for the narrativist thesis can be summarized as follows:
1) Emplotment is a literary operation employed in historiography.
2) Emplotment is a literary operation employed in literature.
3) Literature is fiction.
4) Therefore, historiography is equivalent to fiction-making (cf. Doležel 2010: 21).
42 The first premise, that emplotment is employed in historiography, rests on White’s views
on how historical discourse achieves its “explanatory effect.” Historiography is a three-
staged process.  First,  a  chronicle  is  formed from the elements  in the historical  field
comprised of historical events. Chronicles are open, without beginning nor end, because
they begin when the chronologist starts recording events, and stop when he does (White
1973: 5, 6). Second, the chronicle is transformed into a story through motifical encoding.
A story, unlike a chronicle, is a unit demarcated by a beginning and an ending. Historians
do not find stories in chronicles; they invent them because one and the same event, for
instance, the king’s death, can function as an inaugural, transitional, or terminating motif
in different historical narratives. It is the historian who, in crafting a historical narrative,
decides which of these roles a particular event plays in his or her account of the past (ibid
.:  5-7).  Third,  the newly formed narrative unit is  subjected to one of three modes of
explanation: explanation by emplotment, explanation by argument, or explanation by
ideological implication. Inspired by Northrop Frye (1957), White distinguishes four ways
of emplotment, and derives from them four “archetypal” forms of historical narrative:
tragedy, comedy, satire, and romance. Every historian is compelled to emplot his text
according to one of these four forms (White 1973: 7-8).
43 The second and third premises  claim that  emplotment is  a  fiction-making operation
because it is also employed in literature, and literature is fiction. This is explicitly laid out
in White’s Tropics of Discourse, where he writes that history is the matching of “a specific
plot structure with the set of historical events that he [the historian] wishes to endow
with a meaning of a particular kind,” (White 1978: 85) and adds that “[t]his is essentially a
literary,  that  is  to  say  fiction-making  operation”  (ibid.).  This  establishes  the  double
equation at the core of the narrativist thesis
emplotment = literary operation = fiction–making
44 It is set up by a substitution of terms that White treats as synonymous. He concludes that
historiography is equivalent to fiction-making. Subsequent writers have relied on this
double equation to make even more radical  claims about history,  viz.  that history is
invented (Munslow 1997: 118, 178) and that history is ending (Jenkins & Munslow 2004: 2).
45 White’s views, too, go against the three desiderata set out above, since he denies both
reference and truth,  and seems to support  skepticism about  historical  knowledge by
equating historiography with fiction.  The realist  could attack White’s argument  in  a
number  of  ways.  First,  even though emplotment  is  employed in  both  literature  and
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history,  there  are  crucial  differences  between  fictional  and  historiographical  texts.
Narratives in fiction and narratives in historiography differ in their purpose: the latter
purport to be true, and can therefore be doubted or turn out to be false, while the former
are not supposed to be true, are therefore not supposed to be doubted and cannot turn
out to be false (Van den Akken 2013: 349).
46 Second,  factual  narratives  advance  claims  of  referential  truthfulness  while  fictional
narratives  do  not.  This  difference  becomes  apparent  when we compare  factual  with
forged narratives. Both claim to be true, but the latter, when uncovered, is deemed false,
not fictional. One cannot falsify a fictional narrative in the way one can falsify a forgery
(Tamm 2014: 277-8). More specifically, we can distinguish between world-imaging texts
(I-texts) and world-constructing texts (C-texts). I-texts are representations of the actual
world  and  provide  information  about  it.  The  world  itself  exists  prior  to  and
independently of I-texts. C-texts are the results of world-making practices that construct
the  worlds  represented  in  them.  Such  texts  exist  prior  to  the  world  they  describe.
Literary and fictional texts are C-texts. I-texts are truth-apt while C-texts are not (Doležel
1998:  24).  Historical  texts are I-texts.  Their goal is to express propositions that carry
information about the actual world at some time in the past. Such propositions are made
true or false by the actual world,  not by a world constructed by the text.6 Texts are
identified  as  C-texts  or  I-texts  by  their  purpose,  how they  are  made  and  used  in  a
community. Peirce writes that science is a mode of life:
Science is to mean for us a mode of life whose single animating purpose is to find
out  the  real  truth,  which  pursues  this  purpose  by  a  well  considered  method,
founded on thorough acquaintance with such scientific results already ascertained
by others as may be available, and which seeks co-operation in the hope that the
truth may be found, if  not by any actual inquirers,  yet ultimately by those who
come after them and who shall make use of their results. (CP 7.54)
47 Scientific inquiry as a mode of life is an activity that is important to its practitioners’
sense of identity. The specific goals and ambitions of scientific inquiry distinguish it from
other human endeavors. This influences how judgment is exercised, evidence admitted or
rejected,  and so on (Hookway 2000:  72).  The late Wittgenstein (2009:  § 23) would call
scientific inquiry a language-game that is part and parcel of a scientific form of life.
Forms of life involve agreements in definitions, opinions, and judgments (ibid.: § 241-2).
Scientific investigators have a substantive commitment to the truth that is accompanied
by reflections on and commitment to a method (Ransdell 1977: 164-5). Historians share
these  commitments  with  other  kinds  of  investigators  –  they,  too,  reflect  on  their
methods, scrutinize their sources, and seek to support their claims with evidence (Tamm
2014: 276). This makes the historians’ form of life a scientific one. Thus, historical texts
are I-texts because they are intended to be used as sources of information about the past,
and result from the intention to produce texts that provide such information.
48 Skeptics could argue that such intentions do not change anything because historiography
employs rhetoric. Rhetoric is opposed to truth as well as proof, since its primary aim is
effectiveness and persuasion. This non-referential interpretation of rhetoric comes from
Nietzsche who treated rhetoric as a means for reflecting on truth outside the sphere of
morality.  According  to  the  Aristotelian  tradition,  however,  rhetoric  encompasses
different  modes  of  proof for  the  purposes  of  persuasion.  Within  this  tradition,
argumentation  and  explanation  deals  with  probabilities  and  plausibilities  (Ginzburg
1999). Recent developments in rhetoric, such as Chaim Perelman’s and Lucie Olbrechts-
Tyteca’s  (1969)  new  rhetoric,  define  rhetoric  as  “the  study  of  discursive  techniques
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allowing us to induce or to increase the mind’s adherence to theses presented for its
assent” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969: 4). On this view, dialectic7 and rhetoric are
related: the former is a theory about the techniques of argumentation while the latter is a
practical discipline about how dialectical techniques may be used to convince or persuade
an audience  (van Eemeren Frans  et  al. 2014:  261).  In  real-life  settings,  rhetoric  often
involves reasoning on the basis of non-analytic thinking, which is discursive, and aims to
convince and rationally persuade the audience (ibid.: 261-2, 261n8). Rhetoric in this sense
is  neither  antithetical  to  nor  constrained  by  truth  and  proof.  This  view  was  partly
inspired by Peirce’s rhetorica speculativa, which studied the transmission of meaning from
mind to mind, and from one state of mind to another by way of signs (Olbrechts-Tyteca
1963).  Thus,  the  concept  of  rhetoric  employed  by  the  skeptics  is  too  narrow.  The
rhetorical dimension of historiography does not necessarily exclude it from the domain
of truth.
49 Finally, the stylistic forms of historical narratives have no influence on the relationship
between historiography and evidence. Narratives are not necessarily fictional. Scientific
theories about the evolution of life or the big bang come in narrative forms, but this does
not make them fictional. What matters is not the form of historiography, but its epistemic
relation with the evidence (Tucker 2006: 92, 139). A skeptic could counter that even if this
is the case, arguments are the primary means of rational persuasion, narratives, whether
fictional or factual, are not arguments, and thus cannot persuade on rational grounds.
But it  is not at all  clear that narratives and arguments are mutually exclusive.  Some
arguments make extensive use of narratives. For instance, an arguer may introduce a
story, either factual or fictional, and, through the development of his or her argument,
show how the story supports the argument’s conclusion (see Hunt 2009; Govier & Ayers
2012; Plumer 2015). Story structures can be used for organizing and making sense of the
evidence in support of some conclusion or thesis (Pennington & Hastie 1992, 1993). The
four ways of emplotment distinguished by White could be seen as abstract story schemes
that link together events and actions for presenting evidence (cf. Bex 2011). The links
between events can be temporal or causal, and how the whole sequence hangs together is
evaluated in light  of  our  common knowledge about  the way things  can be normally
expected to go in a familiar type of situation (Walton 2014: 35). Last but not least, it is also
possible that narration itself may be a form of argumentation (see Fisher 1987). Thus, the
non-argumentative nature of narratives is not a foregone conclusion, and cannot be used
as a truism in support of the skeptical point of view.
 
Dialogue and Truthlikeness in Historiography
50 Let’s  begin  by  clearing  up  some  possible  misunderstandings.  Truthlikeness  is  not
probability. Probability, interpreted epistemically, measures the degree of seeming to be
true. Truthlikeness measures the degree of being similar to the truth. Seeming to be true
is  concerned  with  appearances,  similarity  to  the  truth  with  objective  facts  about
similarity or likeness. Probability and truthlikeness do not measure the same thing. The
probability of the proposition “the number of planets is greater than or equal to 0” is
maximal, but it is not very close to the truth (Niiniluoto 1987: 183; Oddie 2014).
51 Truthlikeness is not vagueness. Suppose that, pace epistemicists (see Williamson 1994;
Sorensen 2001),  vagueness  can be  explained by  treating  absolute  truth and absolute
falsity as extrema on an interval  of  truth values representing degrees of  truth.  Such
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degrees are not degrees of closeness to the truth. Suppose Jones is 175 cm. Consider two
propositions: 
1) Jones is exactly 170 cm tall.
2) Jones is tall.
52 The first should be absolutely false on any good theory of vagueness, while the second
should have a relatively high truth degree if our reference class for tall people includes,
say, those who are 185 cm and above. On the other hand, the precise but false (1) is closer
to the truth, or more truthlike, than the vague (2) (Oddie 2014).
53 Truthlikeness is commonly taken not to refer to the acceptability or plausibility of a
proposition (Hilpinen 1976: 23). I will, however, argue below that plausibility is one of the
factors that goes into determining the truthlikeness of a historiographical proposition.
54 One of the biggest challenges for the concept of truthlikeness is the logical problem of
truthlikeness,  that is,  the problem of giving an adequate account of  the concept and
determining  its  logical  properties.  A  solution  involves  defining  a  measure  of
truthlikeness. No generally accepted measure has been found so far. Karl Popper (1962),
who also put truthlikeness on the agenda of 20th century philosophy of science, defined
two measures of truthlikeness in terms of the true and false consequences of a theory.
The  Tichy-Miller  theorem (Tichy  1974;  Miller  1974)  demonstrated  the  inadequacy  of
Popper’s measures. There have been attempts to remedy Popper’s approach by defining a
measure of truthlikeness in terms of the relevant consequences of a theory (see Burger &
Heidema 1994;  Schurz  & Weingartner  1987).  However,  the  applicability  of  relevance-
based  measures  is  limited  (Gemes  2007).  An  alternative  is  to  define  a  measure  of
truthlikeness in terms of similarities,  determined by a similarity metric,  between the
possible worlds in which the proposition is true and the actual world (see Tichy 1974;
Hilpinen 1976; Oddie 1986; Niiniluoto 1987). Besides disagreements over which similarity
metric best captures the intuitive logical properties of the concept of truthlikeness, the
main challenge of the similarity approach is the extension problem: how to appropriately
extend a given measure of truthlikeness between possible worlds to propositions and
larger units of evaluation (Schurz & Weingartner 2010: 423)? 
55 In light of these challenges, I will not attempt to define a measure of truthlikeness for
historiography, opting instead to outline a theoretical basis from which such a measure
could perhaps be defined. The aim is to present some of the factors that a measure of
truthlikeness should take into account, and to show that Peirce’s ideas provide a possible
setting within which it could be defined.
 
Reference and Semantic Dialogues
56 Peirce’s  semeiotic  would satisfy  the first  desideratum for  a  concept  of  truthlikeness,
because it is referential, and broad enough to account for both textual as well as non-
textual  evidence.  Throughout  his  life,  Peirce  formulated  different  versions  of  his
semeiotic. I will rely on his final account, formulated between 1906 and 1910 (Atkin 2013),
for presenting a referential theory of meaning as a viable alternative to the Saussurean
paradigm favored by the skeptics. My reasons for relying on his final account are twofold:
first, the early account was compatible with idealism (see Short 2007: 28ff), and second,
his  final,  realist  account  draws  an  instructive  parallel  between  semiosis,  the  overall
process of sign interpretation (CP 5.484), and inquiry.
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57 Perhaps the most well-known among Peirce’s multiple definitions of “sign” says that a
sign “is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity”
(CP 2.228). A sign gets its meaning from interpretation whereby someone determines which
object the sign refers to, since the relation between a sign and its referent is by itself
insufficient to ground representation (Misak 2004: 16; Pietarinen 2006: 32). Meaning is,
according to Peirce, an irreducibly triadic relation where a sign, s, that refers to an object, 
o, according to an interpretant i (W2: 224; Hookway 2000: 9, 126). To be more specific:
–  Sign:  is  the  signifying  element  in  the  triadic  meaning-relation,  the  material
underpinning in the form of some physical mark that is to be interpreted, that stands in a
dyadic relation with some object, and can enter into another dyadic relation with some
interpreter (CP 4.536; Ransdell 1977: 169).
– Object: is whatever is represented by the sign. This can be anything discussable, whether
an individual or a collection, regardless of whether it exists or not (CP 2.232; EP 2: 498).
The object  determines the sign by placing constraints  on the sign for  the successful
representation of that object with respect to some of its relevant characteristics.
– Interpretant:  is the sign’s more or less clarified meaning, the understanding of some
sign-object relation reached as the end-point of an interpretative process where we have
formed an idea of the difference that the sign’s being true would make (Atkin 2013). It is
determined by the sign via the features of the object, and the way the sign represents it.
58 Each of these three elements determines the others in the sense that each limits what the
others may be: each object limits what may be a sign of it, and each sign limits what may
be  an  interpretant  of  it  (Short  2007:  167-8).  This  triadic  relationship  includes  three
referential relations: a sign directly refers to its object (also known as denotation, or the
real thing it represents), indirectly refers to the characteristics common to the objects
(also known as connotation, or, as Peirce calls it, the ground of the object), and indirectly
refers to the interpretant which provides the totality of the facts known about the object
(information, according to Peirce) (CP 2.418; W2: 59, 82).
59 In Peirce’s  late account,  semiosis was patterned on his  understanding of  inquiry as  a
process that starts from a primitive or impoverished conception of the sign’s object, and
moves through intermediate stages toward a complete conception. At each intermediate
stage of semiosis, both the object and interpretant are developed up to that point based
both  on  previous  stages  and  in  anticipation  of  the  presumed  future  course  of
interpretation that would culminate in a complete understanding of the object (Ransdell
1977: 168-9). The endpoint of this gradual process is the dynamic object (the real object as
it is truly known at the end of semiosis) (Ransdell 1977: 169-70, 169n10-11; Hookway 1985:
139) which is accessed via the final interpretant or the true understanding of the dynamic
object at the end of inquiry (see CP 8.184, 8.343) that interacts with the dynamic object in
that it is a complete grasp of the dynamic object, captures all there is to know about it
(Ransdell  1977:  173),  and  sets  a  normative  standard  for  judging  our  interpretative
responses to the sign because it is “the interpretant we should all agree on in the long
run” (Hookway 1985: 139). The starting point of semiosis is the immediate interpretant (an
understanding of the general features of a sign’s meaning) (CP 5.473). Each intermediate
step involves the dynamic interpretant (our understanding of the relationship between the
sign and the dynamic object, as determined by the sign, at any intermediate stage of
semiosis) that is connected with and constitutes the immediate object (the dynamic object
as it appears at any interim stage of semiosis and differs from it due to partially mistaken
or erroneous interpretations) (CP 4.536; Ransdell 1977: 169).
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60 The distinction between immediate and dynamic objects reflects the realism of semiosis
(Short 2007: 200). It explains the difference between success and failure as well as truth
and falsehood in interpretation. The success of an interpretant depends on reality, the
dynamic object, not on representation, the immediate object (ibid.:  191). The dynamic
object is incompletely knowable because “the Sign cannot express [that], which it can only
indicate and leave the interpreter to find out by collateral experience” (CP 8.314). Collateral
experience, in turn, is the interpretation of different signs as signs of the same object on
the basis of experience that acquaints us with the object referred to by the sign (CP
8.178-9). Signs can be corrected and supplemented because the same dynamic object can
be represented by different signs, and false or incomplete representations can contain
enough  truth  to  enable  one  to  identify  the  object  and  provide  a  more  accurate
representation (Short 2007: 193-4).
61 But why think that collateral experience provides access to a mind-independent reality?
Because experience is characterized by three basic features or categories: firstness is the
mode of being of things that are without reference to anything else, such as appearances
or qualities of feeling (CP 8.328-9); secondness is the mode of being of things with respect
to a second but regardless of a third, such as the experiences of effort, struggle, causation,
and resistance (CP 8.328, 8.330, 1.325); and thirdness is the mode of being of things that
bring a second and a third into a relation with each other by mediating between them,
such  as  a  law  or  a  meaning  that  molds  future  behavior  (CP  8.328,  1.343;  W5:  304).
Secondness is manifest in the experience of reality: “In the idea of reality, Secondness is
predominant; for the real is that which insists upon forcing its way to recognition as
something other than the mind’s creation. […] The real is active; we acknowledge it, in
calling it the actual” (CP 1.325). This is the “Outward Clash” (CP 8.41) of something outside
of our control on our experience that lies at the core of our concepts of reality and its
mind-independent  existence.  It  supports  the  conjecture  that  there  is  something that
would exist as it is, irrespective of whether it is perceived, represented or experienced.
That something is the dynamic object, the end-point or limit of semiosis, which ensures
that the final interpretant, the interpretant we should all agree on in the long run, is at
least potentially obtainable. This also accounts for the self-correcting nature of semiosis,
which is based on the supplementation of signs.
62 But  how  is  all  this  relevant  to  historiography  where  the  past  cannot  be  directly
experienced? In his most famous trichotomy, Peirce distinguished between three kinds of
signs:  icons (signs  that  exhibit  firstness  and  refer  to  their  objects  in  virtue  of  their
properties) (EP2: 291; CP 2.276), indices (signs that exhibit secondness and refer to their
objects by being causally or otherwise connected to them) (CP 2.305), and symbols (signs
that exhibit thirdness and refer to their objects by virtue of a law that causes a symbol to
be interpreted as referring to that object) (EP2: 292). According to Peirce, all propositions
are informational symbols. To convey genuine information, a proposition must be true:
If anything is true, definitely and decidedly true, that of which it is said to be true
may be in some sense a creation of the mind. Still, once created, it must be in a
measure  independent  of  thought,  so  that  merely  denying  the  truth  of  what  is
asserted shall not destroy its truth. Otherwise, it does not mean anything to say it is
true. (MS 463: 9)
63 An informative proposition conveys some truth in the sense of being connected to reality,
independent of thought, because
the interpretant of [the proposition] […] represents the proposition to be a genuine
Index of a real Object,  independent of representation. For an index involves the
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existence of its Object. The definition adds that this Object is a Secondness, or real
Fact. (EP 2:278)
64 This is the case only if  the real object in question is a real event that no amount of
reinterpretation can erase from the historical record, and actually modified the attributes
of consequential states of affairs, no matter how minutely, due to genuine secondness. In
other words, genuine information reflects on or reports about some state of affairs that
was  in  direct  reaction  with  the  original  observing  mind  present  at  the  source  of
information (De Tienne 2006). Thus, the realism of Peirce’s mature semeiotic opens the
possibility for genuinely informative propositions about past states of affairs to actually
refer to the past because their interpretants are indices of those past states of affairs.
Despite its similarity to contemporary causal theories of reference, Peirce’s account is
broader since the connections between indices and their objects are not limited to causal
relations (see Short 2007: 219-20, 219n4).
65 Semiosis is goal-directed or purposeful process: the end of semiosis determines the stages
leading to it and elements of the triadic meaning-relation determine each other. Peirce
was a realist about potentiality, actuality, and generality in the form of laws: “the will be’s,
the actually  is’s,  and the have beens are not  the sum of  the reals  –  they only cover
actuality.  There are besides would be’s and can be’s that are real” (CP 8.216).  Thus, he
explains the purposefulness of semiosis by incorporating the doctrine of final causation
into his theory of signs. He defines final causation as follows:
we must understand by final causation that mode of bringing facts about according
to which a general description of result is made to come about, quite irrespective of
any compulsion for it to come about in this or that particular way; although the
means may be adapted to the end. The general result may be brought about at one
time  in  one  way,  at  another  time  in  another  way.  Final  causation  does  not
determine in what particular way it is to be brought about, but only that the result
shall have a certain general character. (CP 1.211-2)
66 Whether this doctrine can be justified is not as relevant for my concerns as is the fact that
including it in a referential theory of meaning makes realism epistemically more risky
than a theory without final causation. It would be beneficial for my aims to retain Peirce’s
late  semeiotic  views while  giving an ontologically  parsimonious account  of  the goal-
directed nature of semiosis. A suggestion about how this could be done is found in one of
Peirce’s less known “dialogical” definitions of “sign”:
A sign is an object made by a party we will call the utterer, and determined by his
idea, which is the sense or depth of the sign, in order to create in the mind of the
interpreter an interpretant idea of the same object. (MS L 237: 1)
67 In his logical writings, Peirce interpreted quantifiers like “every” (CP 5.542) and “any”
(EP 2: 408) as parts of a dialogue between two parties, the Utterer and the Interpreter
(Pietarinen 2006: 77; Brock 1980; Hilpinen 1982, 2004). He also repeatedly emphasizes that
all thought and deliberative reasoning is dialogical:
[…] all deliberative mediation, or thinking, takes the form of a dialogue. The person
divides himself into two parties which endeavor to persuade each other. From this
and sundry other strong reasons,  it  appears that all  cognitive thought is  of  the
nature of a sign or communication from an uttering mind to an interpreting mind.
(MS 498)
68 Note that he even illustrated the emergence of experience, and secondness, in dialogical
terms:
Although in all direct experience of reaction, an ego, a something within, is one
member of the pair, yet we attribute reactions to objects outside of us. When we say
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that a thing exists, what we mean is that it reacts upon other things. That we are
transferring to it our direct experience of reaction is shown by our saying that one
thing acts upon another.  […] There are in experience occurrences;  and in every
experience of an occurrence two things are directly given as opposed, namely, what
there  was  before  the  occurrence,  which  now  appears  as  an  ego,  and  what  the
occurrence forces upon the ego, a non-ego. This is particularly obvious in voluntary
acts; but it is equally true of reactions of sense. (CP 7.534, 7.538)
69 The dialogical form of thought is, according to Peirce, in some ways akin to chess:
Thinking always proceeds in the form of a dialogue, – a dialogue between different
phases of the ego, – so that, being dialogical, it is essentially composed of signs, as
its  Matter,  in  the  sense  in  which  a  game  of  chess  has  the  chessmen  for  its
matter. (MS 298: 6)
70 Peirce’s dialogical ideas can be modeled as games in the game-theoretic sense. He seems
to have anticipated 20th century ludic developments in logic, viz. both the game-theoretic
semantics of Jaakko Hintikka and his collaborators (see Saarinen 1979; Hintikka 1973) as
well  as  dialogical  logic,  where  dialogues  are  understood  as  games  (Lorenzen  1958;
Stegmüller 1964; Lorenzen & Lorenz 1978). Peirce’s semeiotic dialogues are compatible
with Hintikka’s semantic games, with the dialogue games of dialogical logicians, and have
connections with game-theoretic pragmatics as well.
71 Semiosis,  as  outlined above,  can be recast  in  game-theoretic  terms.  Game theory,  as
introduced  by  John  von  Neumann  and  Oskar  Morgenstern  (1944),  and  taken  in  an
evolutionary direction by John Maynard Smith (Maynard Smith & Price 1973; Maynard
Smith 1982), is a collection of analytical tools for studying interactive processes between
agents  (Osborne  & Rubinstein  1994:  1).  A  benefit  of  treating  semiosis  as  a  semantic
dialogue or game between an Utterer and an Interpreter is that this allows us to explain
the goal-directed nature of  semiosis  without appealing to final  causation,  since goal-
directed processes and purposeful activities, such as interpretation or inquiry, can be
understood as games (Hintikka 2007: 94). Note that what follows is not a reconstruction of
Peirce’s own views, but a simplified development of them.
72 At the center of semiosis is a semantic dialogue, understood as a game-theoretic structure,
which links signs with their objects, and language with reality (see Hintikka 1968, 1973). A
semantic dialogue game is an interpretative process associated with a particular sign. There
are two players,  (quasi-)minds capable of  interpretation,  who can occupy the roles of
Utterer, who transmits a sign, or Interpreter, who interprets it. These roles can be occupied
be  humans,  animals  or  nature.  Every  semantic  dialogue  game  is  an  attempt  at  the
verification (by one of the players) or falsification (by the opposing player) of a given
sign. Each player has a strategy, that is, a plan of action (Carmichael 2005: 4) that consists
of instructions for choosing and evaluating alternative actions in light of what the player
ought to choose (Pietarinen 2006: 84, 441, 442). For Peirce, meaning is a habit. This notion
served a similar function for him as strategy does for games: both are exemplified by
individual actions, both are plans of action for all possible circumstances, and both are
involved in the interpretation of signs (see CP 5.400, 5.491; Pietarinen 2006: 82-4, 99-100).
A player’s strategy determines the course of interpretation that arrives at the meaning of
a sign. Each player has a payoff that measures how well they are doing in all possible
outcomes of the game. Payoffs determine which player wins (verifies or falsifies the sign),
and which player loses.  A sign is  true if  the Interpreter has a  winning strategy in the
correlated game, viz. if the Interpreter can always choose his moves (depending on what
has happened before in the game) in a way that leads to his winning no matter what the
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Utterer  does.  The  Interpreter  wins  if  he  can verify  the  truth  of  the  sign,  and loses
otherwise,  while  the Utterer  wins  if  he  can falsify the sign,  and loses  otherwise  (cf.
Hintikka 1974:  52).  This corresponds to the Tarskian notion of truth (see Hintikka &
Sandu 2011). The game ends once a sign has been assigned an object by the Interpreter’s
interpretant. The Interpreter wins if the sign represents the dynamic object as it truly is
(if the sign is true of the object), and the Utterer wins if it does not. Hence semiosis, which
determines the meaning of a sign, is an interactive process that gives rise to the totality of
all actions, possible or actual, that do, might, will or would arise, as a consequence of
playing the game in different contexts and settings (cf. Pietarinen 2007: 231-2).
73 One could argue that a dialogical interpretation of semiosis is not enough to guarantee
the desired outcome in the way final causation does in Peirce’s original account. But it is
well-known that repeated plays or games in evolutionary settings tend to converge on
stable  equilibrium  outcomes.  Likewise,  repetition  or  evolution  can  drive  a  semantic
dialogue to a determinate and stable outcome. But the problem of equilibrium selection
shows that there can be multiple stable outcomes of a game-like interactive process, and
there seem to be no reliable criteria for determining which of these is chosen, or whether
the chosen outcome is optimal. While this matter would require additional research, it
seems to me not to be an insurmountable problem since Peirce’s notion of final causation
includes chance as an essential ingredient: chance provides the range of outcomes from
which a selection is made (see Short 2007: 137). Thus, even if a dialogical treatment of
semiosis omits some of Peirce’s original metaphysical ideas, it seems sufficient for an
ontologically modest referential theory of meaning that would not tip the fundamental
ontological  tradeoff  as  much  in  constructivism’s  favor  as  a  would  a  theory  that
incorporates final causation. This would fulfill the first desideratum for truthlikeness in
historiography: an ontologically modest referential theory of meaning.
 
Inquiry, Truth, and Information-Seeking Dialogues
74 Peirce’s pragmatist theory of truth could satisfy both the second and the third desiderata
outline above since it is fallibilist, links truth with inquiry, emphasizes the communal
aspect of inquiry, and is closely connected with his semeiotics which accounts for both
the interpretative and referential aspects of truth.
75 There are two closely interacting components in Peirce’s theory of truth:  reality and
truth. Peirce defines the real as “that whose characters are independent of what anyone
may think them to be” (W3: 271). Different definitions of truth can be found in Peirce’s
writings. The best known among these is the following:
Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of
investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same
conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we wish,
but to a foreordained goal, is like the operation of destiny. No modification of the
point of view taken, no selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind
even,  can  enable  a  man  to  escape  the  predestinate  opinion.  This  great  law  is
embodied in the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which is fated to be
ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the
object  represented  in  this  opinion  is  the  real.  That  is  the  way  I  would  explain
reality. (W3: 273)
76 Inquiry, like semiosis, is for Peirce a purposeful or goal-directed processes that evinces
final causation (W3: 3, 45): a proposition p is true not solely because a community agrees
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that it is true, but because reality causes it to be true (see W3: 45). Mind-independent
reality constrains the scientific community, which employs the scientific method, in a
way that the inquiries and judgments of its members lead them, in the long run, to the
belief as well as the agreement that p is true; truth draws us toward itself (Ransdell 1977:
162;  Hookway 2000:  47).  This  interpretation is  supported  by  another  one  of  Peirce’s
definitions of convergent truth: “Truth is that accordance of the abstract statement with
the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief”
(CP 5.565). Peirce’s theory combines aspects of both the correspondence and coherence
theories of truth (Haack 1976: 247). It is compatible with Tarski’s notion of truth (Misak
2004: 127-9). It is fallibilist, since although inquirers will eventually reach the truth, at no
point in the process is there any guarantee that their current beliefs will not be falsified
by further evidence (Hookway 2000: 49-50, 77). On Peirce’s account, then, a proposition at
any stage of inquiry is only approximately true, i.e. truthlike, but not absolutely true. An
absolutely true proposition is the ideal limit of inquiry. These ideas place Peirce within a
broader tradition of thinking about truthlikeness that stretches from Nicholaus Cusanus
to Karl Popper.8
77 The incorporation of final causation into theories of truth and inquiry tips the scales of
the fundamental  ontological  tradeoff  in  favor  of  simpler  constructionist  alternatives.
Misak (2004: 167-8) provides a modest and non-metaphysical interpretation of Peirce’s
theory of truth. On her reconstruction, truth depends on humans to the extent that it is a
property  of  beliefs  and  beliefs  are  mental  states  of  humans  (ibid.:  132).  Truth  is
convergence toward consensus at the end an indefinitely prolonged inquiry.  It  is not
convergence in the sense of decreasing erroneousness of theories as they approach the
truth, because convergence in this sense is about approaching the limit while consensus
is  about  agreement  (ibid.:  122-3).  Convergent  truth is  objective  not  because it  would
correspond to reality by the end of inquiry but because it would be believed by a final
community of inquirers at the end of inquiry (ibid.: 131-8).
78 While I find much to like about Misak’s interpretation, her emphasis on consensus over
convergence leaves no room for truthlikeness, and a slim ground for realism, because it
downplays the constraining effect of reality on inquiry. An account of truthlikeness in
historiography that takes Peirce’s ideas as its starting point should retain ideas about
convergence as approximation to the limit of truth while also making room for consensus
as an additional mechanism that drives theories toward ever increasing truth. If such an
account aspires to be metaphysically modest, then it should not appeal to final causation.
79 According to Peirce, inquiry starts with a cognitive problem or question and ends when
the question has received an answer (W2: 471). This view of inquiry is reminiscent of the
Socratic elenchus – inquirers interrogate nature and nature responds. Taking a clue from
the dialogical interpretation of semiosis, I propose that inquiry, too, can be treated as a
type of dialogue, viz. an information-seeking dialogue that constitutes inquiry (Hintikka &
Saarinen 1979; Hintikka & Hintikka 1982: Hintikka 2007: 85). It can be understood as a
two-player game, where one player is the Inquirer and the other is Nature. The goal is for
one player, the Inquirer, to elicit or make explicit tacit information possessed by the
other player, Nature. In game-theoretic terms, a game against nature is a game against an
unreasoning entity whose strategic choices affect the other player’s payoff, but which has
no awareness of, or interest in, the overall outcome of the game (Straffin 1993: 56). The
Inquirer can, among others things, make interrogative moves that consist in addressing
questions to Nature. Nature’s answers are assessed in light of the Inquirer’s background
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knowledge. Questions are essentially requests for information, the specification of which is
the  specification  of  the  epistemic  state  the  questioner  wants  to  be  brought  about
(Hintikka 2007: 4-5, 89). They elicit tacit information. A question is more informative than
another if answers to it are more informative than answers to another. In the context of
natural  science, questions  can  be  thought  of  as  observations,  in  the  context  of
historiography, they can be thought of as explanatory hypotheses. The assumption is that
for each question there is a certain set of potential answers. The availability or non-
availability of answers affects the Inquirer’s strategies, and the set of potential answers is
not limited by the Inquirer’s language or conceptual scheme but by matters of fact (ibid.:
85-7). In historiography, answers can be construed as explanations of hypotheses by the
evidence. Players’  strategic considerations involve strategies of questioning as well as
strategies for drawing further inferences from the answers. The Inquirer wins if he is able
to verify the thesis expressed in his question.
80 As with semiosis and semantic dialogues, construing inquiry as a dialogue accounts for its
goal-directedness without appealing to anything more than the strategic interactions of
the participants. The method of science, according to Peirce, has two parts-the logic of
science, which is voluntary since we can control the methods we apply in our reasoning,
and experience which is involuntary (Misak 2004: 86). The methods and inference rules
employed in an information-seeking dialogue are given by its definitory rules (Hintikka
2007:  7).  These  can  be  construed  as  codifying  the  shared  methods  of  a  scientific
community. The strategic rules of an information-seeking dialogue tell the player how to
play well in order to increase his or her chances of reaching the goal (ibid.). Each partial
answer in the sequence of questions and answers in an information-seeking dialogue is a
truthlike claim about some past event.
 
Consensus, Plausibility and Persuasion Dialogues
81 Historiography and evidence are linked by theories that identify the evidence as such in
the first place. Competing historiographies are competing explanations of the evidence
that posit different descriptions of historical events to explain the evidence (Tucker 2006:
93). Disagreements are due to the absence of knowledge of history, incomplete theories,
and the underdetermination of evidence by theories (ibid.:  141ff).  Information-seeking
dialogues with the evidence of past events left by nature (understood here as including
past  human  agents)  account  for  the  truth  factor  in  truthlikeness.  This  should  be
distinguished from consensus, since, as Misak has argued, the two are different. In the
context of historiography, however, consensus among a sufficiently large, uncoerced, and
uniquely heterogeneous group of historians is an indicator of historical knowledge (ibid.:
6,  20ff).  Consensus  is  attained  within  the  community  through  argumentation  and
persuasion.  The  evidence  used  for  persuasive  purposes  is  acquired  in  inquiry.  If
persuasion is successful, that is, if it manages to create consensus within the community,
then  the  evidence  as  well  as  the  associated  explanatory  hypothesis  become  part  of
historical  knowledge.  Thus  convergence  and  consensus  should  be  seen  as  two
mechanisms that determine the truth and likeness (i.e. similarity) factors of truthlikeness
in historiography, respectively.
82 In keeping with the dialogical approach adopted so far, persuasion within the community
can be seen as a persuasion dialogue. This is a game between two players that starts with a
conflict of opinions where one player holds one thesis or hypothesis, and the other either
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denies it or holds a contrary hypothesis. The overall goal is the resolution or clarification
of  an issue that  is  the cause of  the conflict  of opinions.  This  is  done by proving or
disproving the thesis (Walton 2008: 4-5, 11; Walton 2006a: 99). The underlying value of
this type of dialogue is respect for the truth (Walton 2006a: 100). This supports the goal of
resolving the conflict of interests by rational argumentation, which can involve or take
the form of narration, in order to approach truth as an ideal. Movement toward the truth
is evaluated through a process of collecting and testing evidence, done partly within an
information-seeking dialogue, which leads to the rational acceptance or rejection of a
player’s thesis (ibid.: 128).
83 In natural sciences, the likeness of a proposition to the truth is increased or decreased by
conducting  experiments.  What  could  fulfill  a  similar  function  in  historiography?
Following Georg Iggers, I suggest that we look to plausibility:
[P]lausibility obviously rests not on the arbitrary invention of an historical account
but involves rational strategies of determining what in fact is plausible. It assumes
that the historical account relates to a historical reality, no matter how complex
and indirect the process is by which the historian approximates this reality. (Iggers
1997: 145)
84 Plausibility is a complex notion that can be understood in different ways. A hypothesis or
claim is plausible if it appears true under normal circumstances and familiar types of
situations, in light of the credentials represented by the bases of its credibility (Walton
2006b: 71; Rescher 1977: 38-9). For example, given two competing explanatory hypotheses
of evidence, the one that is more in line with our understanding of how things typically
are in the world is more plausible. A hypothesis or claim is prima facie plausible if it has
sufficient epistemic support for additional inquiry (Bartha 2010: 15-8). 
85 The normative aspects of Peirce’s theory of truth suggest what role plausibility could
have in historiography. Both scientific inquiry and convergence to truth occur within a
community. When an inquirer asserts a proposition and assents to it, viz. proclaims that
it is true, he or she incurs commitments. The asserted proposition is presented as being
truthlike. Asserting such a proposition forms part of the practice of cooperative inquiry
within  the  scientific  community.  The  proposition  is  directed  both  to  one’s
contemporaries and to a potentially unlimited number of future inquirers. The scientific
community is held together by the practice of assertion. He who asserts a proposition is
trying  to  get  other  community  members  to  believe  it.  Assertion  is  the  vehicle  for
scientific debate. Once a public assertion is made, the asserted proposition is open to
criticism. If the assertion was improper or the proposition false, then it is eventually
withdrawn (see Hookway 2000: 65, 67-8, 70, 72-3, 144). The plausibility of an asserted
proposition  is  settled  by  consensus  reached  through  (narrative)  argumentation  in  a
persuasion dialogue. Rhetorical strategies, narrative structures, evidence – all of these
are employed by the historian to increase the plausibility of his or her account in the eyes
of the community.
86 Thus,  historians belong to a  community of  researchers.  They engage in information-
seeking dialogues with their evidence in order to arrive at informative and true claims
about the past. They address the (often partial) answers obtained from those dialogues to
other community members, and try to persuade them of the truthlikeness of their thesis
or explanatory hypothesis about the evidence. The likeness of those claims to the truth is
determined  by  the  outcomes  of  persuasion  dialogues  with  other  members  of  the
community. The measure of truthlikeness of a claim about the past is determined by the
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informativeness of the answers obtained from information-seeking dialogues with the
evidence,  and  its  plausibility  and  rational  acceptability  at  the  end  of  a  persuasion
dialogue with other members of the scientific community.
 
Conclusion
87 Skeptics have argued that historiography cannot make truth-apt claims about the past
because statements about the past are neither true nor false – historiography is akin to
fiction and historians to authors of fiction in that both construct the worlds they write
about. This view rests on a particular theory of meaning which is subject to criticism.
Peirce’s semeiotics and pragmatist theory of truth,9 reinterpreted in dialogical or game-
theoretic  terms,  provide a  plausible  basis  for defining a  concept  of  truthlikeness  for
historiography in a way that accounts for its epistemic and methodological specificities. A
plausible account of truthlikeness would go some way toward justifying optimistic fallible
realism about historiography.  Defining an actual  measure of  truthlikeness within the
limits set by the framework introduced here is beyond the scope of the present essay.
Similarity-based approaches define truthlikeness in terms of distances between possible
worlds. Dialogues qua games can be viewed in standard form (represented by matrices) or
in extensive form (represented by trees or directed graphs).  One option would be to
explore distance measures between the vertices of a graph as a basis for a measure of
truthlikeness. Future research will have to determine the viability of this approach.
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NOTES
1. This is the conclusion of Larry Laudan’s (1981) pessimistic induction. 
2. It seems that NEC could be interpreted in different ways. A strong interpretation would deny
the existence of objects and their properties in some domain (e.g. there are no natural numbers
qua abstract  objects).  A weaker interpretation would deny the existence of  objects but could
affirm the existence of properties attributed to them (e.g.  there are no natural numbers qua
abstract objects, but their properties belong to mental constructions).
3. The name “postmodern challenge” comes from Lubomir Doležel (2010: ix).
4. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me.
5. Michael Riffaterre tried to add this fallacy to the panoply of informal fallacies (see Pavel 1986:
118).
6. The logic and metaphysics of time are complex issues that I cannot enter into here. Regarding
reference to the past, suffice it to say that historical discourse employs natural language, and one
of  the  metaphysical  presuppositions  of  natural  language  semantics  seems to  be  that  past
moments of time and past places can be the referents of ordinary language expressions (see Bach
1986). 
7. Dialectic is understood here as the art of rational argument by conversation, not as a Hegelian
comprehension of the unity of opposites (see Walton 2006a: 47, 70). 
8. See Niiniluoto (1987: 165-71). For a dissenting view, see Misak (2004: 119-20, 122).
9. The realist theory of truth I have derived from Peirce’s remarks differs notably from how
pragmatist theories of truth have been traditionally described. I would argue that the theory
outlined here can still be called pragmatist because truth, according to Peirce, at least as I have
interpreted him here, is neither correspondence nor coherence nor consensus, but the fallible
“opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed upon by all who investigate” (W3: 273). In other
words, the account outlined here deserves to be called pragmatist because it retains the central
tenets of Peirce’s views,  viz.  that truth is related to inquiry,  connected with the practices of
inquirers, and fallible. 
ABSTRACTS
Truthlikeness  in  historiography  would  allow  us  to  be  optimistic  fallible  realists  about
historiography – to hold that historical knowledge is about the past, true albeit fallible, and can
increase  over  time.  In  this  paper,  three  desiderata  for  a  concept  of  truthlikeness  in
historiography will be outlined. One of the main challenges for truthlikeness is historiographic
skepticism  which  holds  that  historiography  is  indistinguishable  from  fiction  and  cannot
therefore  furnish  us  with  true  knowledge  about  the  past.  Such  skepticism  rests  on  the
postmodern challenge, which will be criticized on the grounds that it rests on an implausible
theory  of  meaning.  It  will  be  shown that  Peirce’s  semeiotic  and pragmatist  theory  of  truth,
interpreted dialogically or game-theoretically, provides a suitable framework within which to
pursue the project of defining a concept of truthlikeness for historiography. Finally, directions
for possible future research into truthlikeness in historiography, including ways of defining a
measure of truthlikeness, will be considered.
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